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Industrial Sector Labor Absorption
The recent increased focus on the LDC unemployment problem takes many
forms;

like development itself, the issue is complex and many-faceted.

But

perhaps no link in the chain of attempted understanding has been as uncertain
and controversial as the question of the range of technology choice actually
physically open to the contemporary LDC in its non-agricultura l sector--even
if it were of a mind to listen to relevant advice on the subject.
This paper is intended to throw some light on the particular question
of LDC industrial sectors' ability to efficiently absorb unemployed or under
employed labor in the course of the development processo

We know that even

where countries have been growing at 5 or 6% annually in real terms in the
past-•and overall growth has generally been quite satisfactory in the 60's,
as the Pearson Commission records--indus trial sector growth rates of from
\

8 to 10 percent annually have been accompanied by labor absorption rates of
Moreover, the elasticity of industrial employment with
1
respect to output has not only been low but apparently falling over time.

only 2 or 3 percent.

Consequently, virtually everywhere in the LDC world

some combined index of

unemployment or underemploymen t seems to have been on the rise-•and accom
panied by an even more pronounced rise in the awareness of the inadequacy of
per capita income as the main indicator of adequate performance.
When this somber historical record .is combined with the fact that even
if ✓~ero population growtli'' policies were ad.opted everywhere tomorrow, the age
structure of the LDC population presently in existence will yield a labor
force explosion of major proportions (3 1/2 to 4 percent annually over the
1

see Werner Baer and Michel R, Aa Herve, "Employment and Industrializa
tion in Developing Economies, 11 .C.:'.14~~";.g:1::L,.d.2~rp~_,L9f Economi.£!, Vol. LXXX,
No. 1, February 1966.

-

-2next decade or so) the dimensions of the problem become clear.

If the developing

world should be unable to absorb these inevitable projected additions to their
labor force--never mind mopping up the substantial pool of underemployment
already in existence in most places--the prospects are indeed grim.
The role of the industrial sector in this context--even when we define
it broadly as including all non-agriculture except the
of course tells only part of the story.

II

spongy" services--

Clearly, if an LDC is developing at

all, it is likely to have to activate its preponderant agricultural sector
in the process.

Whether or not agricultural productivity increase in this

context turns out to be labor-using or labor-displacing is extremely important to the size of the burden placed on non-agricultural sector absorption,
for any given rate of aggregate growth.

But we shall here concentrate on the

capacity of non-agriculture to efficiently absorb labor.

Not only is there

more misunderstanding on this--somehow most people seem to accept the realism
of alternative scale, tenure and input combinations in agriculture, while
holding religiously to fixed proportions in industry-•but we also know, re
gardless of how the inquiries into the employment consequences of the Green
Revolution come out, that, over time, people inevitably will be pushed out of
agricultur-e., in the case of success, and pulled out, in the case of failure-•and
that the

non•agr.i.cult.w:a-1 · .

.secto.x:.~.§.__ab:llit.y_

.to...ahsorb them efficiently wi 11

play a crucial role in any total balanced development story.
In Section II, we try to place the generally poor record of industrial
labor absorption in its proper historical and policy perspective.

Section III

advances some preliminary notions of the differential nature of the innovation
process over time in that context: and Section IV attempts to demonstrate

the empirical relevance of these notions, under conditions of a favorable
policy environment, by reference to historical Japan and contemporary Korea

and Taiwan.
II

It has by now become part of the conventional wisdom to criticize
the so-called import substitution regime most LDC's followed during the 50 1 s
and 60 1 s.

This regime usually comprised a well-known syndrome of policies

including exchange controls cum import licensing; budget deficits cum infla

tion; low (sometimes negative) real rates of interest.

The aim, generally

speaking, was to redirect pre~independence traditional colonial flows to the
creation of social and economic overheads and import replacing consumer goods
industries.

The consequence for economic performance was often a spurt in in

dustrial output growth, but inefficient, ioeo capital and import-intensive, in
character, accompanied by the discouragement of exports and of agricultural
output, low rates of industrial employment, low rates of technological change,
low domestic saving rates, and a relatively heavy dep-endence on foreign aid.
As LDC governments became increasingly aware of the economic costs of
this set of policies, one could observe, during the 60 1 s, a tendency, at least
in some countries, to consider turning to an alternative set of policies.
This set can be characterized, if

again at the cost of oversimplification,

as aiming at a reduction of some of the gross inefficiencies attending indus
trial development through the readjustment of a number of crucial, previously
distorted, relative- -pri.c.es, --including_ tlHLexcha.nge .rate ..and the interest rate.

By replacing quantitative controls in the foreign exchange market with tariffs
and moving towards more realistic exchange rates, via either a~ iure or

2£

-4facto devaluation, and replacing severe credit rationing with higher interest
rates, developmental access and participation could now be offered to medium
and small-scale industrial entrepreneurs for the first time~

In the course of

this second, or export substitution phas~industrial development is based
less

on

natural

and

more

o~ human

resources;

exports--

especially of the non-traditional labor-using variety~-are no longer discriminated
against and can begin to expand· domestic saving rates can move up into the
i

Rostow take-off range; agriculture is no longer discriminated against by unfavorable terms of trade and can play its historical role of generating sur
pluses which, when successfully channeled, can provide simultaneous employment
opportunities for the unskilled labor force simultaneously being released; and
indigenous technological change in both sectors can assume much greater impor•
tancee

While there exists as yet no marked trend towards such export substi•
tution policy packages in the less developed world generally, its adoption
had indeed had remarkable results, eogo 7 in Korea, Taiwan and West Pakistan,
in turning some situations of virtual overall stagnation in the 50's into high
growth situations-in the 60's.
Perhaps most important for us here is the fact that the new and better
signals in this phase are likely to induce the adoption of different, more
labor-usin~ or unemployment reducing, technologies and output mixes.

In this

context the vital role, for better or worse, of technological flows between
rich and poor countries inevitably comes into play.

The very co-existence of

countries at very different levels of technology has to represent one of the
most important influences on the perfcrmance of LDC's, past, present and pro
spective.

It is the precise nature of these technological flows and the way

-sin which they have been accommodated by LDC's which has, in our view, had a
decisive impact on overall performance during these past two decades of develop,
ment.

Alternatively put, it is also in this area in which the greatest pote~

tial for improved LDC performance in the 70 1 s on both output and employment
grounds can and must be locatedo
Under the influence of the record of the past

many have concluded

that a conflict between these two objectives is inevitable.

But before we

accept such fundamentally dismal conclusions we have an obligation to carefully
examine the validity of the proposition, especially in countries which seem to
have performed well with respect to both output and employment growth in the
past.

Certainly such an examination is necessary before we can intelligently

address the question of how the LDC world as a whole will be able to efficiently

absorb the inevitable projected additions to their labor force, not to speak

of mopping up the existing backlog of the unemployed and underemployed•
. As. we look i-nto--the·W-S; · three ·major schools of thought seem to be

emerging with respect to the solution of the unemployment problem.

One suggests

we need more growth, i.e. a higher growth rate, traditionally arrived a~ with
enough "trickle down" to achieve full employment~

This is clearly, at best,

an expensive and unrealistic proposition, requiring huge volumes of foreign
capital, for instance, if the rickety import substitution dominated machinery
of the 60 1 s is to yield, without restructuring, substantially more employment.
The second approach also assumes no major parameter shift in the behavioral

relations of the system.

It suggests, however, that after the traditional

planning exercise has been consummated, a "supplementary strategy" must be

employed to mop up the remaining unemployed"

This customarily means insti•

tuting labor-intensive pub-lie works programs,. either in the rural or urban

areas.

There is a real possibility here, especially where the rural infra

structure, for example, is inadequate--but evidence to date indicates that
blue-printing and executing capacity may be a constraint as one goes from
project to project.

But most importantly, this approach fails to make the em

ployment issue part of the primary strategy of development and relegates it
to an after-thought, which--despite all S~year plan protestations to the con
trary-•was essentially the situation in the 50 1 s and 60 1 s.
ThE third approach attempts to change the nature of the growth pattern
itself by making it more responsive to the factor endowment.

This means that

we don't try to "dethrone the GNP, 11 except perhaps in political terms, but we
try to place it on a sturdier throne.

In other words, onte the open dualistic

economy moves out of its administer-ed-pric-es• import -substitution hothouse, and
into a more market-oriented export substitution phase, it becomes possible fot
major efficient changes in output mix and technology--both in a labor-using

direction•-to take placee

Such restructuring, as can be

demonstrated in the

cases of Taiwan and Kore~ may permit the economy to have more of both, i.e.

maie output

them.

J!m! more employment, rather than having to make a choice between

Moreover, such a move towards more market-oriented signals has absolutely

nothing to do, as it is sometimes alleged, with a return to colonialism or
handing the country over to unbridled free enterprise.

The same desirability

of letting•the endowment be heard in production decisions applies to the
socialist cotintries; and, in fact, the market is increasingly being used as a
tool of socialiat planning and in pursuit of socialist objective~ in Eastern
)

Europe todayo
Finally, we should note that income dist~ibution, a third and increasingly
important dimension of developmental performance also stands to benefit.
)

',

There

are those who assume that any tendency at wage restraint at low levels, in
keeping with the condition of labor surplus, must be bad for the "little
man."

In fact, quite the opposite is likely to be the case.

Where the poverty

problem is in considerable part an unemployment problem--due either

to inade•

quate government willingness or abi 1i ty to redistribute fiscally--the "little
man" who is hurt by wage restraint is the alreaciy employed, not the usually
disenfranchised , unemployed or underemployed.

Not only total output and

hence per capita income but also the wage bi 11 is likely to rise once the
economy moves to efficient labor-intensive technologies and output mixes.
Figures on income distribution in a number of countries interestingly enough
indicate that Taiwan is the best performer here as well, ioeo sporting the
most equal distribution cf income in

the samp lea

Even more instructive is the

fact that Taiwan shows up as a much better performer on this count in 1964•
when export substitution was in full swing,,-than in 1953--during its import
substitution phase.

'While economists who are conditioned to think always in

terms of trade-offs will hate to admit it, labor surplus developing countries,
well within their efficiency frontier, may be able--with the right policy
changes•-to enjoy more employment, more growth, and more income distribution
at the same time~
With this realization., a lot more attention is now being paid to the
importance of factor price distortionst over-valued exchange rates, inappro
priate fiscal policies; "prema~:u:re" welfare legislation and other institutional
constraints which have obviously contributed to the low rate of labor utiliza•
tion, especially i.n the LDC: s' growing non-agricultur al sectors.

But much

less attention has be1::n paid to date to the actual technological choices
available to the typical LDC--on the assum~tion its entrepreneurs and government

-8-

officials could be brought to the point of facing a more reliable set of sig•
nals relative to the existing factor endowment and skill capacities.

In other

words, even if domestic fiscal, monetary, credit and exchange rate policies
were ideal, would the choice of technology from the shelf available abroad
and/or producible at home yield a substantially different kind of technology••
or are there other, overwhelmingly severe, choice constraints forcing accep•
tance of technology currently available in the most advanced of the capital
eKporting countries?
Many LDC officials, aid donors, and scholars still share the point of

vtew that most technological change, especially in non-agriculture, must take
place abroad, and that the borrowing LDC's, in fact, have only a very narrow
set of technological choices open to themo

If only the co·efficients attaching

to the latest vintage machinery produced in the most advanced countries are
relevant

all the talk about alternative.f.a<!tor proportions in response to

alternati.ve-~endowments. becomes largely irrelevant--or restricted to
changes in output mixes via tradeo
Such skepticism on the scope of technological choice is, of course,
not unrelated to the still considerable dragging of the feet on abandoning
the import substitution policy package in much of the less developed world,
In spite of the real world demonstration of what can, in fact, be accomplished,
there

remain

tion regimeo

formidable obstacles to the dismantling of the import substitu
Direct controls imply absolute power--as well as supplementary in•

comes-•for the civil service which it is loath to surrender lightly.

More

over, the inevitably greater role for private enterprise under any liberalized
regime z:uns up against associations with col_o~alism-..and....£.eers of a n t i ~ l
give-aways.

But-one -or-the-· more_.1>owerful arguments on the side of conservative

-9··

policy-makers remains the supposed rigidity of the choices actually available.
In large part it results from deducing the inevitability of fixed proportions
from their historical prevalence during the import substitution phase.

We

intend to investigate this issue by first attempting to elucidate the differen
tial nature of the innovational process in each phase, and then to demonstrate
the potentially substantial scope for labor-using innovations by reference to
the cases of historical Japan and contemporary Korea and Taiwan.

lll.
First, and foremost, it should be remembered that, unlike in an ad•

vanced country where technological change is viewed as rather automatic and
routinized, or as capable of being generated through R and D expenditures

according to some rules of cost/benefit analysis, in the contemporary developing
societies technological change cannot either be taken for granted or afforded
In this situation we cannot avoid the question

through R and D allocations.,

of what, given the existence of a shelf of technology from abroad, is the

pattern by which the typical less developed economy, in fact, manages to in•
novate.

This question in turn forces us to look at least at the following

dimensions more carefully:

1)

the precise nature of that technology shelf;

2) the availability within the LDC' s of required initial managerial and entre
preneurial capacity; and 3) the changing nature of that required managerial
and entrepreneuria l capacity in the course of transition to modern growth.
The technology shelf developed in the mature industrial economies
abroad may be described by a set of unit activities following a smooth en•
velop curve as in Diagram Io

A particular technology can be described by an

L-shaped contour producing one unit of output with a given pair of capital and
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labor coefficients.

The technology shelf is composed of the complete set of

such activities or technologies which have been demonstrated to be feasible
somewhere in the advanced countries at some histori~al point in time, including
the present.

Since there exists a number of technology exporting countries,

e.g., the U.S., Germany, U.K", Japan, with continuous technological transfers
amongst themselves as well as with the LDC' s, it is not unreasonable to
postulate the existence of a single technological shelf for the lending world
as a whole.

For example., unit te:::hnology A0 may have been generated in Ger

many in 1920, A in the UoS. in 1920; A2 in the UoS. in 1950, etc.
1

In other

words, as we move to the left along the shelf we run into more modern tech
nology, i.e. technology of more recent vintage and of higher capital intensity.
As capital per head increases this means that the typical worker· has learned
to cooperate with more units of capital of increasing technical complexity.
This capital deepening process, in other wor-ds, is more complicated than the
textbook version of "homogeneous" labor being equipped with more uni ts of
"homogeneous" capita L
At any point in time the typical LDC is then theoretically free to
borrow a particular unit activity from anywhere along this shelf.

What tech•

nology is chosen and what happens as an immediate and ultimate consequence of
that choice, i.e" what secondary processes and reactions are set off, is, of
course, all part c111d !)-arcel of the· innovation£. l process taken as a whole.
quality of that process,

The

ea~h step of the wa7J in turn depends on the nature

of the entrepreneurial:, manageria 1 and skilled labor capacity of the borrower.
The role of innovation must thus be seen as intimately related to the
stage in which the developing economy finds itselfc

In other words, the role

o·f technological change in output and employment generation must be viewed as

~ 12 --

sensitive to the same discernable phases of growth as the econotey' moves in
In the

transition from open agrarianism to Kuznets' modern economic growth.

first post-independence, or import substitution phase, previously mentioned,
an effort is made to increase the supply of domestic entrepreneurship and the
economy's learning capacity, partly through the importation of people via aid,
but mainly through the system of protection established by government policies.
In fact, the most reasonable explan3tion for the import substitution syndrome
is that it is a response to a real or imagined shortage of entrepreneurship
and that it permits time, through informal learning-~by~-doing or more formal
educational processes., foT this entrep:reneurial capacity to develop.

1

In terms of our Diagram I; this means that 7 although the technological
shelf may look as indicati:!d by ,;urv8 SS 7 the

~Sf.cl

choices available to the

developing country during the import substitution phase are more aptly des
cribed by S'S'o

In other words, due to the inadequate state of entrepreneurial

capacity during the early post-independence period of physical controls, the
efficiency of generating output per unit of capital in the borrowing country
is likely to be substantially below that in the lending country.

This is

likely to be more true the more capitaJ.~intensive the import, i.e. the further
removed from the cultural inheritance and experience of the borrower.

Such

technological imports are. often a~compMLi.ed by imported engineers, even
managers and supervisors--,adding up to what is o:~ten called a turn-key project.

The most advanced and so9histicatcd technology can; of course, be made

to "work," in the physical sense,,, ~ven in the most backward developing econmmy.
1
some few countries, like ?falayniR, wi,:h command over a very strong
and reliable natural resources base, may be able to avoid such a phase alto
gether. Moreover, there r:learJ.y exist better and ·worse (L ec. less and more
costly) import substitution picickages to choose from, e.g" comparing Brazil
and Ghana, but we cannot expm~ci on thi:; very interesting subject in the con
text of the present paper . ,

nl3·"

But a shiny new plant imbedded in a society many decades distant is bound to
be substantially less efficient.

This is true for a thousand direct reasons,

such as the absence of even minimal skilled labor supplies, domestic subcon
tracting and repair and maintenance possibilities, as well as for many more
subtle sociological reasons which enter into the total milieu in which the
plant is asked to operate.

The more sophisticated and removed from the rest

of the economy the technological transplant, in other words, the greater
the relative inefficiency, as indicated by the shape of the S'S' curve.
If and when the economy then moves away from the import substitution

,
phase and enters into the second phase of liberalization and export substitution, a second important, if unintentional, type of innovation is likely
to make its appearance, namely a reduction in the extent of the inefficiency
of the original transplanted technologyo

Call it X-efficiency if you like,

but the cost of the pure transplantation is likely to be reduced, quite un
intentionally, i.e~ largely as a result of factors external to the profit
maximizing behavior of the productive unit itself.

This increase in produc

tive efficiency over time will increase in quantitative significance as the
import substitution hothouse temperature is gradually turned
competitive economy emergese

down and a more

In Diagram I the effects of gradual enhance

ment of efficiency may be represented by the arrows tending, over time, to
1
move S'S' back towards the original SS position.
Another, more conscious, and quantitatively more important type of
innovation begins to gather importance during this same, second phase of
1
A more sophisticated analysis, differentiating between the labor and
capital -saving nature of this move; depending on the region in which the
economy is operating, is possible., but wi 11 not be introduced here. See also
"LDC Innovation Analysis and the Technology Gap/' (with J.C.H. Fei) paper
presented to the IEA Conference on "The Gap Between thE Rich and the Poor
Nations: to be published :,.n 1971

transitio n.

This phenomeno n may be called innovatio nal assimilat ion, i.e.

innovatin g "on top of" Lnported technolog y in the direction of using rela
tively more of the abundant unskilled labor supply.

As the economy shifts from

a natural resource based growth pattern in the import substitut ion phase, to
a human resource based system in the export substitut ion phase, this means an
increasin g sensitivi ty to the continuou sly changing factor endowment , first
in terms of the efficient uti. lizatio;_1

of the domestic unskilled labor force,

and later in terms of the incorpora tion of growing domestic skills and in
genuity.

In other words, the app-rop:ria te type of technolog y finally in place

must be one in which not 01~ly the ini ti.al choice from the shelf but also the
adaptatio ns and adjustmen ts c0nscioi.1.s J.y made thereafte r in response to
changing domestic resource and capabilit y ccnstrain ts

play an important

role.
The more liberalize d the economy, in terms of the governme nt's per
forming a catalytic role through ::he mark.et> by indirect means, rather than
trying to impose resource allocatio n by direct controls, the better the
chances that the millions of dispersed decision-m akers can be induced, by the
sheer force of profit maximiza tion, to make the

11

r:i.ght 11 decisions .

Even in

the absence of technolog ical change,. as long as surplus labor overhangs the
market, and the expectati on is for even illore of the same in the future, we
can expect little upward movement in real wages and little capital deepening .
Superimpo sed on this is the aforement ioned assimilat ion type of innovatio nal
behavior which tends, for the same reason_~ to be slanted in a labor-usin g
direction .

In the typical labo-r surplus type of economy-- or one likely to

become one over the next decade (as is probably the case in much of Africa)-
all this means as much efficient accom,nod ation of pure labor services as

'" 15-

possible.

1

Whether this will lead to a sectoral output shift in favor of

labor intensive export commodities or a mix predominantly addressed to the
domestic market, of course, depends, ceteris Qaribus, on the type, e.g., size,
of the economy.

No strong generalization as to the relative importance of

shifts in output mix vse changes in technology for given mixes is likely to
be valid.

It should be clear, however; that the important issue is that the

search for innovation can now be considered a conscious activity of the in
dividual entrepreneur .8nd--given the combination of more realistic relative
price signals after liberalization plus greater entrepreneurial capacity--that
it is likely to be directed towards various forms of indigenous capital
stretching on top of the imported technology"

Such capital-stretching can be

represented by a reduction in the capital coefficient per unit of output.
The effective post-assimilation set of unit technologies, i.e. after domestic
assimilation, may thus be represented by curve S11 S" in diagram I, with the
strength of the indigenous labor-using innovative effort indicated by the
amount of the "downward" shift in the capital coefficient.
It should be noted here that a negatively sloped technology shelf,
e.g.

ss,

representing pure technological transplantation, permits, as you

move to the left, higher labor productivity levels: but only at increasing
capital cost.

In a country characterized by capital scarcity this may mean

increased technical unemployment (a la Eckaus) and hence a lower value of
per capita income for the economy--in spite of the higher level of labor
productivity achieved.

Domestic capital stretching, however, can materially

affect that situation by en.ab ling more workers to be employed per unit of
1
rt is important to emphasize the ,wrd "efficient" since we are not
concerned here with the, possibly also legitimate, objective of employment
creation as a separate social goa]._, to be traded off agninst output growth.

the capital stock.

If the post=assimilation unit technology set, e.g. S11 S11 ,

is upward sloping, as the economy moves to the left by first borrowing abroad
and then innovating domestically on top of that borrowed technology, higher
labor productivity levels become consistent with lower capital-output ratios.

1

In summary, once the overall policy setting has turned more favorable
and permitted the economy to enter the second phase of transition, it is
this indigenous capital-stretching capacity which we consider to be of the
greatest importance--especially for the contemporary developing economy facing
the formidable labor force explosion predicted for the 70 1 s and 80 1 s.

It is

in this specific area also where the skepticism of planners, engineers, and
aid officials generally is most pronounced~-especially with respect to the
range of technological choice really available when all the dust has settled.
Historical examples from the Japanese case, as well as contemporary evidence
from Korea and Taiwaq,permit us to demonstrate the existence and potential
importance of such capital=stretching innovations for the labor surplus
developing country"

IV
As has been pointed out by many observers, including Allen and Lock2
wood) the most significant feature of the Japanese landscape in the early

Meiji period--following hard on two centuries of self-imposed, nearly complete,
1rhe historical evidence within individual developed countries over
time seems to indicate an apprvximation to constancy in the capital-output
ratio, i.e. approximating a horizontal position.
2
George C. Alien, JaPJill§_Se Industrializa~ion: Its Recent Development
and Present Conditions, New York~ InstHute of Paci fie Relations, 1940;
W.W. Lockwood, 11£.q_nomic Developme~~-9.J_~~~~_c1n. 1868-1928, Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press; 195li-o

isolation--w as her ability to choose relatively freely from among the items
on a technologic al shelf perfected in the West.

The reopening of foreign

trade and the resumption of other related contacts, especially the flow of
technical personnel in both directions, led immediately to the stimulation of
technologic al change by direct borrowing.

But while the Japanese have often

been characteriz ed as possessing a consummate ability to copy and imitate,
it is noteworthy that, in fact, very soon the majority of domestic innovation
activity 11 c-:,nsisted of the adaptation of foreign te,chniques to domestic con
ditions.11

1

The reasons for this relatively early move to a responsiven ess of the
industrial sector's technology to domestic endowment conditions are compli
cated and cannot be dealt with here.

Suffice it to say that post-Restor ation

Japan did not engage in very extensive or prolonged import-sub stitution
policies--p artly because extra-terri toriality deprived her of the ability to
establish strong protective import barriers, and partly because the government
quite early thought it more efficient to work through the market, i.e. by
using taxes and subsidies, rather than through extensive controls and govern
ment ownership.

Those government plants in directly productive areas which

were established during the immediate post-Restor ation period were viewed
mainly as pilot projects and sold off to private interests by 1890.

Thus

Japan moved relatively quickly into the export substitutio n phase.
In assessing the importance of capital stretching innovations , it is
useful to recognize distinction s between innovations relating to the machine

\i.

Miyamoto, Y. Sakudo and Y. Yasuba, "Economic Development in Pre
Industrial Japan: 1859-189l~, 11 Journal of Economic History, December 1965,
p. 557. The same authors also report (po 563) that similar capital or land
stretching innovations took place during the same period in the agricultura l
sector, mainly via new cultivation methods on the intensive margin.

.. 13.,

proper; innovations relating to the production process as a whole, emphasizing
the importance of activities within the plant but peripheral to the machine;
and innovations with respect to the production process as a whole, emphasizing
plant size and organization at various stages of that process.
With respect to machine-related capital stretching innovations, the
simplest and quantitatively probably most important example was the running
of imported U.K. and U.S. machinery at rates and speeds substantially in ex
cess of those used abroad.

For eXample, once the kerosene lamp made night

work possible, spinning could be done on two, sometimes three) shifts daily) with
but two or three rest days a month,,

This meant that the average work week

per machine was two to three times that encountered in the country of origin;
and, since physical depreciation is much less important than economic ob
solescence, using a machine twice as intensively does not wear it out twice
as fast.

This heavy use of machinery typical of the 19th century Japanese in

dustrial sector meant that the normal gap between the physical and economic
life of a machine was substantially narrowed and capital was considerably
"stretched."
Moreover, there was in evidence a related speed-up of the very same
spinning machines.

By running the machines at faster speeds and/or by sub

stituting cheaper raw materials, i.e. raw cotton=-and making up for it by in
creasing the number of women to handle the resultant increase in the number of
broken threads--an additional major saving in capital could be achieved:
Certain differences in the industries of the two countries are
importan~ and must be noted.
different0

The raw material is essentially

Though the Japanese do use some American raw cotton,

the bulk of their cotton is from India and is of shorter staple,

-19more likely to breakage.a. and requiring more labor to put it
through the machineryo

The yarn spun has much more of the coarser

counts that require more labor •• oBy adding more labor it is run

somewhat faster than American practice••• All of these factors are
in some way related to the cheap labor policyo
because the labor is cheap.

They are there

1

Japanese spindles were equipped with a 7/8 inch instead of a one inch front

roll to accommodate the shorter staple cotton when operated at higher speeds.
For these several reasons, i.e. differences in the yarn count and
differences in the speed of the machine, as well as differences in the number
of shifts, we find that there was a very marked substitutio n between capital
and labor in the cotton spinning industry.

For example, Orchard reports

that a competent Japanese spinne·r working on a 20 yarn count operated from
300 to 400 spindles, while an American spinner on the same count yarn tended
from 1,020 to 2,688 spindles, that is, hetween 2 1/2 and almost 7 times as
many.

2

As the U. S'. Tariff Commissicn reported:
In order to distribute the fixed overhead charges in the way of
high interest and depreciatio n costs, and to earn the large
amounts needed to pay a normal rate of dividend, every effort
has been made to obtain the largest possible output from the ex
pensive equipment and plant.

Machinery is therefore run at high

speed, and almost since their inception the Japanese spinning

1
John E. Orchard, Japan's Economic Position, New York:
Book Co., Inc., 1930, p. 367.
2
Ibid., p. 3670

McGraw-Hill

mills have been operated night and day;; employing two 12-hour
shifts (22 actual working hours) for an average of 27 days a
month.

1

Here again)given a standard count of yarn, the average Japanese spinner is
seen as tending 240 spindles, while the American counterpart on the same
machine tends abcut 1,000 spindleso

As late as 1932 weekly man-hours per

11 000 homogeneous spindles of the same quality ranged from 328.8 in Japan to
164.8 in the United Kingdom and 143~1 in the United States.

2

A somewhat similar story can be told with respect to cotton weaving.

Once again,
the high cost of mill construction is considerably reduced if you
consider the hours during which the mill is being put to effec
tive use,.

So far in Japan the wheels have turned round during

20 out of 24 hours, while in Europe only 8 hours are being
worked.

Effective working time in England is less than 38

hours per week, as 2 hours out of these are devoted to cleaning;
this is done in Japan after working hours.

3

Again) the U.S. Tariff Commission reports that "in weaving staple cotton
sheetings, the ordinary Japdnese weaver seldom operates more than two plain
looms, while the .American weaver, with peYhaps some assistance in supplying
fresh bobbins, normally tends from 8 tc 10 plain looms.

114

1
The Ja2anese Cot_t,on InduSt!,Y_,9nd Tra.£!;, Uc S~ Tari ff Commission,
Government Printing Office, Washington; 1921 7 p~ 99.
2

The World Textile :I;,1:1-dustrv: Economic and Social Problems, Vol. 1,
International Labour Office) Geneva, 1937, Po 209.
3
.Arnold S. Pearse, .~an~and Chi_na. Cotton Industry Report, Inter
national Federation of Master Cotton Spinners 1 and Manufacturers' .Association,
Manchester, 1929, Po 86,,
4

The Japanese C9..t_ton Industr,r and___ ·:£1rade.,, ££• ci to, p. 100.
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Perhaps the most convincing evidence that these adjustments along
the machines proper constituted a rational response to very marked differences
in factor endowments was that in weaving, in contrast to spinning, the latest
automatic equipment from abroad was not, in fact, invariably imported.

Quite

frequent!~ non-automatic looms were taken from the shelf instead, permitting
more stretching than would have been possible in the case of initially more
capital intensive technologieso

Unlike some of the contemporary less developed

countries, Japan clearly did not wish to import ahead of its entrepreneurial
and skilled labor capacities,

1

As the Tariff Commission put it,

the price of the automatic loom is more than twice that of the
plain loom, which, with the additional expense involved in the
importation from the United States or Great Britain, made the
total outlay too high in a country where the interest charges on
money were relatively much higher than the cost of labor.
Japanese mill managers have, therefore, hitherto preferred to
employ more workers and to forego the more labor=saving but
more expensive machinery, in contrast to the situation in the
United States where the high-priced labor is economized
.
2
rather tan
t h e mach inery,
h
Taking cotton spinning and plain loom weaving on similar products together,
they concluded, in summary, that

1-rhe U.S. Tariff Commissfon (Q.e,~ ill•, Po 116) reported that a ship
ment of automatic looms, imported shortly after the turn of the century, had
been found so difficult to operate, that, after removing the batteries and
warp-stop motions; they were instead run as plain looms; two looms to a weaver.
2
The Japanese Cotton Industry and Trade, EE•.£!!•, p. 116. A related
interesting example of technical flexibility far beyond ~hat most engineers
are willing to admit to is provided by the Toyoda automatic loom, one of the
few indigenous Japanese inventions in this areae Subsequently manufactured
by Platt's and Oldham 1 s under a Japanese patent, it was advertised to require
20 girls per loom in England; 50 girls had always been used in Japan.

-22=
the average Japanese spinner or weaver tends about one-fourth
the number of spindles or looms usually assigned to one person
in an American mille

A comparison of the total number of per

sons employed in the two countries to operate individual plants
of similar size, and, viewed more broadly, a comparison of the
total number of persons employed in the whole American industry,
per 1,000 spindles, with the number that would be required on
the similar balanced basis under the Japanese conditions, con
firms the general relation observed, that the Japanese mills re
quire between three and one-half and four times as many opera1
•
A
.
as t h e nmerican.
tives

In the case of silk production, which, together with cotton, made
up more than 70 percent of total industrial output-until _the turn of the cen

tury, we have similar evidence of the ability to innovate in a capital
stretching direction on the machine proper.

In raw silk, for example, the

Japanese employed more than twice as many girls as did the reeling basins in
Italy.

In other areas, well into the twentieth century, Japanese railways

employed 19 workers per mile of track compared with 7 in the

u.s. 2

In the

production of printed goods, the following episodal account may be instruc
tive:
Recently, a Japanese manufacturer of plain linoleum decided to
undertake the production of printed goods.

He dispatched a re

presentative to the United States to purchase the necessary

equipment~

The representative was familiar with the modern

1
Ibid., p. 113.

2
orchard, £?.£•

.£.li•,

P~ 375c

linoleum printing machine, printing several colors at one time
and turning out as much as 15,000 square yards in 9 hours, but
he considered it too expensive a piece of equipment, especially
since his labor was being paid only about 50 cents a day, and so
he sought out, in an American plant, an old hand block printing
outfit.

It was not for sale.

storeroom of the factory.

Its parts were lying about in a

Some of them were 40 years old, and

the whole outfit had been discarded 15 years before.

But the

Japanese representative purchased it and had it shipped to Japan.
In the immediate outlay of capital he saved money, for he pur
chased the old equipment at the price of a printing machine or
even below the price

of a new hand outfit, but he installed in

his plant equipment that could only have been disposed of as
junk in the United States,,

He started in Japan a new industry

in a stage of technical development that had become obsolete years
before in the older industrial countries.

1

Many of the extra workers in Japanese plants were not engaged on the
machine proper, but in what might be called machine-peripheral or handling
activities.
were devised.

In place of mechanical conveyor belts, human conveyor belts
Packaging was more often done by hand.

As Orchard again reports,

"at one of the largest copper smelters in Japan, clay for the lining of the
furnaces is carried down from a nearby hillside on the backs of women.

At

the plant of the Tokyo Gas Company, coke is put into bags by hand and then
carried by coolies, some of them women, to the barges in the adjacent canal.

1
Orchard, .ill?•

ill•,

Pc 246.

Coal, even in the larger Tokyo plants, is unloaded by hand and carried in
baskets to the power houses."

1

The ability to substitute labor for capital

in such activities peripheral to the machine proper apparently existed and
the quantitative incidence was substantial.

Very often such activities were

machine paced in the Hirschman sense, i.e. while they might have looked waste
ful to the untrained Western eye, they were, in fact, paced by well-spaced
machinery as part of the same production line which contained large numbers
of unskilled laborersa

2

A third type of capital-stretching innovation of which much use was

made in historical Japan i ~ a t might be called the plant-saving variety.

This is often characterized by the co-existence of different historical stages
of production in the same industry.
represent outstanding examples~

Raw silk production and cotton weaving

In the former industry silkworm rearing

and

cocoon production were handled mainly by farmers I wives in small home-made
sheds, extensions of the rural households.

In cotton weaving, most of the

yarn was "put out11 to farm households, with individual looms dispersed in
farm houses and worksheds.

But even in the more modern factory-style spinning

industry, preparatory and finishing processes were carried out largely at
the cottage level.
This rather remarkable survival of domestic industry on a subcontracting basis must be explained largely in terms of the exploitation of complemen
tarities between many small labor-intensive operating units and the large in
dustrial management unit.

The tr~ditional merchant middleman, as a representative

1
Ibid., p. 255.
2
This is very similar to contemporary methods of construction with the
use of reinforced concrete in India and Pakistano Here a cement mixer is
linked to the final pouring of the concrete by a long chain of workers passing
the cement from hand to hand; the cement is put in place just before it is
ready to cool and hardeno

of the sub-contracting unit, served as both supplier and market for the
goods to be worked up domestically.

A specialization of functions as between

workshops, even as between the members of a given family, developed.

One

roof economies could be achieved in this fashion, ioe. by using cheap labor
in cooperation with old-fashioned machinery at the workshop level, while
economies of scale could be achieved in the financing, purchasing and merchandising stages.

1

The continued relative importance of this household type

of enterprise is quite remarkable; cottage style industry contributed more
than 2/3 of industrial output in 1878, almost 60 percent in 1895, and re
tained substantial importance well into the twentieth century.

Not only

lacquerware, pottery, porcelain, sake, fruit and fish canning but also such
new consumer goods coming to the fore over time as bicycles, electric lamps
and rubber, were to exhibit the same characteristics.
Plant areounts to more than 50 per~ent of total investment in plant
and equipment in most countries~

The ability to utilize households for putting

out operations and thus reduce expenditures on plan~ undoubtedly amounted to
a major kind of capital stretching innovation.

By deploying

familiar but

improving machinery over large numbers of scattered mini-plants, large
amounts of unskilled labor could be deployed in both direct production and
in satisfying the resulting increased demand for transportation and handling
activities.

In this fashion 7 Japanese entrepreneurs were able to, first,

incorporate pure labor services and, later, domestic ingenuity and skills,
into the industrial production processes, largely for export.
111 sometimes even a single part is not completed in one shop or home
but is shaped in one and painted or plated in another." H, G. Aubrey, "Small
Industry in Economic Development, 11 Socia 1 Research, September 1951.

An examination of the capital-labor ratio in the non-agricultural
sector in Japan during the period discussed indicates the effectiveness of
capital stretching innovations at the aggregative level, i.e. while the average
annual rate of capital deepening ·was 4, 3% between 1906-1917, the earlier
period, between 1892 and l900~was characterized by capital-deepening at a
rate of 2.8% annually, declining to 1.7% between 1900 and 1906.
This

seems to at least suggest that Japanese entrepreneurs were

getting better and better, through a learning-by-doing process, at innovating
in a relatively labor-using direction before the unlimited supply of labor
condition came to an end as the reserve army of the unemployed and underem
ployed was substantially mopped up after World War Io
In contemporary Korea, devaluation in i963 and a major interest rate
reform in 1964 laid the basis for major changes in technology as well as out
put mix.

Examples of capital-stretching adaptations of imported technology

abound in textiles, electronics and plywood production.

In the manufacture

of silk, for example, l girl mans 2 looms as contrasted with 6.8 equivalent
looms in contemporary Japanc

In reaction to the now :rising wages in Japan,

Korea is taking over the lower quality yarn spectrum ,;-1here more girls can be
employed to make up fer the inferior quality of the raw material.

In cotton

weaving, one Korean girl mans 3 looms as contrasted with 4 in Japan; in
spinning the contrast is between 600 and 900 spindles.

Moreover, Korean

machinery is run for 3 eight-hour shifts daily as contrasted with only 2 such
shifts in Japan~

Peripheral to the machines proper, we may note that the con

temporary Japanese use of a conveyor belt system, for example between the
carding, gilling and combing operations, is replaced by human hands in Korea.

-27In the production of plywood what at first appears as production pro
cesses very similar to those carried on in the U~S~, i.e. fixed proportions,
in fact, turn

out to be quite flexible--inter estingiy enough mainly because

of the greater machine speed combined with much more labor-intensive repair
methods used.

In the United States, defective pieces of lumber are cut out

automatically by machine and discarded.

In Japan, defective pieces of lumber

are cut out by hand and the section is discarded.

In Korea, defective sections

are cut out by hand, the scraps saved, and the defect plugged manually.

Here

once again a lower quality raw material can be upgraded to an equivalent
quality output through the application of cheap labor,
we found twice as many workers per unit of capital

Consequently, overall

equipment in Korea, i.e-

123 workers are engaged per equivalent capital production line as contrasted
with 72 in Japan; moreover, a Korean line is worked a 22-hour day as compared
to 20 in Japan.

At the same time between 10 and 15 percent more workers are

engaged in inspection, repair and maintenance of both materials in process and
the machinery in place~
In electronics, machine-related labor·•using innovations and adapta
tions are most prominento

In transistor assembly operations, for instance,

given wage rates lOX lower· than

equivalent operators get in the U.S.

(for the same firm)) the machinery is run at physica 1 full capaci. ty, io e.
six days, thr_ee-shifts a day which is 20 percent above the U.S. equivalent.
Moreover, certain special operations such as feeding and packaging are usually
done by hand on the assembly li.ne, instead of automatically.

In spite of

the greater use of labor; productivity per worker seems to be higher due
partly to the faster learning process (it was repeatedly stated to take at
least two weeks less to train Korean girls in assembly than Americans) but
mainly to the greater discipline and attentiveness on the assembly line

throughout.

For example in one firm

the difference in speed of assembly

on identical equipment yields a 30 percent differential in output (from 68
units per machine hour to GS) and in a die mounting process it rises to more
than 100 percent (from 113 units per hour to 240).

These greater speeds of

operation, either due to faster machine or operator pacing> are once again
accompanied by putting additional girls into more intensive testing, inspec
tion and repair efforts than is encountered in Japan or the U.S.
pieces are not thrown away but repaired by hand.

Defective

Similarly, with machinery

itself working at physi~al full capacity, considerably more manpower is allo
cated to the maintenance and repai~ of the in-place capital equipment.
With respect to other, organizational and plant-related technological
choices, the most important phenomenon clearly resides in the area of sub
contracting, both dom.e.stically. and irrternationallyo

Domestically, subcon

tracting to local equipment and parts manufacturers is being increasingly
practiced, especially in the electronics industry; sometimes, as the experience
of several companies indicates, it takes two to three years before the domestic
subcontracting supplier, via a learning by doing process, has become a lower
cost producer than the main plant or import alternativeso

While such

capital saving innovations, mainly via the reduction of plant and large-scale
urban overhead requirement~ are not yet as wide-spread in Korea as in histori
cal Japan (and contemporary Taiwan)) they are markedly on the increase in a
number of other industries as well.

Internationally, of course, accepting

a sub-contract for the labor intensive phase of a multi-stage and elsewhere
1

technologically demanding production process, is a potentially very efficient
way of harnessing virtually pure labor services to the deveJ.opment process.

Bonded export processing schemes, consisting of tariff free zones into which,

often under subsidiary or subcontracting arrangements with Japanese or American
firms, raw materials are imported> and then reexported, after value in the form
of cheap labor has been added, can be most helpfuL

This scheme now yields

close to 20 percent of a Korean export volume which itself has been rising
at an almost incredible 30-40 percent annual rate over the past three years.
But it is to the larger question of the productive

absorption of

labor through changes in the output mix and trade that we must turn in this
connection.

In 1962 land-based food-stuffs and raw materials made up 75

percent of total exports ,;-,hi le 1abor-bc1 sed light manufacturing industries as
a whole, including plywood, raw silk_, cottou textile, wigs and footwear
arr.ounted to 15 percenta

By 1968 the situation had been completely reversed,

with 77 percent of the exports in manufacturing and only 14o5 percent in food
stuffs, livestock and raw mnter:1.ai.s°'

It should, moreover, be noted that

small-scale manufacturing exports, L e.c L1 units of less

than 10 workers, un

doubtedly the most hibor-iutensive part of the spectrum, grew from 18. 6 per
cent of the total in 1963 to 31.4 percent in 1968.
As a consequence of all this
1

manufacturing employment doubled between

63 and '69, with light industry, in particular, increasing its ~mployment at a

rate even in excess of v2lue c1dded (see Table 1 )o
to reverse its liberalization trendJ after 1968,

2

1

At least until Korea began
the capital-labor ratio

for manufacturing as a whole actually declined after 1964 (see Diagram II). We also
b scale here
have evidence, for ex2mplc ::.::1 Table 2, that there exists a good deal of dispar1.
1

r would like to acknowledge the assistance of Professor Sung-Hwan
Jo of Sogang University, Seoul, in this ~ontexto
2

This reversal is part of a larger story which cannot be ·dealt with
in the context of this paper"

-30Table 1
KOREA

~

Employed
Industrial
Labor Force
(annual)

Employed
Industrial
Labor~
(3 Year Moving)
Average

P.nnua 1
Growth Rate

1952
1953
1954
1955

1,789

1956

2}223

2,242

1957

2, 7J.6

2,461

1958

2,444

2,629

1959

2,729

2,745

1960

3) 062

2,643

1961

2,139

2,912

1962

3,536

3,101

1963

3,630

3,658

1964

3,809

3,879

1965

4,199

4,106

1966

4,312

4,397

1967

4,680

1968
1969

5.5% ('56-'62)

6.3% ('63- 1 66)

......i
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Table

2

Capital Intensity £X Establishment ili~=
Korea.J,LNining and "Manufacturing. 1968·

Est.

Size

Jj.xeg_AJ,se~

Noo of Workers·

Capita 1/Labor
Ratio

--- -

5-9

23,722

82, 183

.289

10-19

28,601

79,141

.361

20-49

38;367

100,586

.381

50-99

28,695

73,467

.391

100-199

28,406

76_,485

• 371

200-499

68,512

120,875

.567

500+

188,421

258,446

• 729

Paul Kuznets: "Labour Absorption in Korea Since 1963," paper
presented to the Conference on Manpower Problems in East and
Scutheast Asia in Singapore: Nay 22-28, 1971.9 Table 8.

-33as in many other, less "·well-behaved" countries.

1

This is due to the well

known discrepancies in residual factor price distortions affecting large and
small firms, with real wages lower and capital costs higher for the smaller
units.
Relevant micro-economic data are harder to come by, as firm inter
views proved unsuccessful in elicting

reliable data at the firm level. The

leading Korean timber company, however, did show a decline in its capital
labor ratio from 35.8 in

1

65-66 to 27.8

in

1

68~69.

In Taiwan too, once the liberalization policies of the early 60 1 s
had substantially reduced some of the major distortions in relative prices
which comprise the import substitution syndrome, marked labor-using innovations

took place in the textiles, electronics and food processing industries.
Large-scale mushroom and asparagus production as forms of agricultural by
employment (similar to silk in early Japan),

2

combined with related processing

and canning activities_,provided major markets for surplus unskilled labor,
especially female.

With time, and facilitated by the establishment of the

Kaohsiung Export Processing Zone, export substitution via a dramatic expan
sion of labor intensive manufacturing took place.
Again, at the macro-level first, consequent to all this,industrial
employment grew at rates of 3. 0% annually between

1

52 and '59 (see Table 3),

but accelerated to 8.1% annually. for the decade of the 60's, once the transition
to export promotion had been completed.

If we divide non-agriculture into

Kuznets' M and S sectors we see that the rate of labor absorption rose from

1From Paul Kuznets, "Labour Absorption in Korea Since 1963, 11 paper
presented to the Conference on Manpower Problems in East and Southeast Asia,
.21?.· ill·
2

In fact, such non-farm earnings comprised 72% of agricultural incomes in 1 62.
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:rA11r~B
_Bmpioyed
1..lliLtlS tr. i a 1

].~

Ern.Q loved
Indil£!rial
b.flbor Force
(3 Year Moving
Average)

~

(annL1al)

1952

1, 198

1953

1)223

1,227

1954

1,261

1,258

1955

1,291

l)' 285

1956

1,304

1,320

1957

1) 366

1,363

1958

1/:-13

1,422

1959

17481

17478

1960

1/ 536

1.) 538

1961

1) 598

11 597

1962

1,689

1,678

1963

1,781

1,760

1964

l,8l~3

1,851

1965

1,938

1,935

1966

2 1 OY,

2,067

1967

') 'i·'.;\O
c-,

2,251

1968

2: ,:}80

3) L.c66

1969

2, ◊-, 9

L..- 7

Annual

Growth Rate

3ol% ('53-'59)

J
8.1% ( 1 60- 1 68)

I

./

4.8% annually i.n 1950.,60 to 7.,5% in 1960-69: in the

l
.
to 6.5% for the same periods, in Che S sector,,

i:

sector, and from 3.2%

Equally significant is the

fact that once interest :.::-ates and other reforms had been completed--in
addition to the exchange and lar..d reforms which took place earlier--this trend
seems to have accelerated; Leo for the

1

64-6~ pe:i:io:! ;:;:is :relcv.snt rates are 8. 7%

for the M sector and 7o2% for the S sectoro
In 1952 rice and sugar constituted 78 percent of Taiwan's export
earnings.,

By 1969 this had shrunk to 4o 8 percent.

During the same period

non-traditional agricultural products, including fresh and canned fruits and
vegetables rose from zero to 10 percent of tne total; and., most impressively,
manufactured goods, including wood and plywcod products rose from 5 percent
to 69 percent of the totalo

The full ::'.:~ncD',ions of this structural change are

recognized when we again note that total export earnings were ricing very
rapidly 1 at rates in 2xcess of 20 percert. c:nnuelly) especi:.;1-ly during the
1960 1 s.,

At the micro-level on the basin of 20 n.rm inte.rv.1.ows coLducted, most
of the capital-·s::retching L.1. evidence cls.2rly tool< pl8c2 in fabricating,
as opposed to continuous processes"

2

0-.:te la:rge plact:i.cs factor) 7 p:coduced

both raw materials (PVC plastics) a ..1d fini.she:l product3 (1,arious plastic products inch1ding furniture .:rnd toy,:,),

:~ts ooard chdrrnm :repo;;-ted that in the

continuous process (of proc;ucing :-:esin for l::V'.~ plosticc) th0 c-1pital-labor
ratio of his plant was nbout the sa,1:e r:'..' that c:" other p ].ants of the parent
company in the United States,, wh:i. le in the f.abricati:ig pn:-ress the capital

labor ratio -..:,as about o:::-ie"•half of that of the Am':!ricc.111 pJ.ants.

1

These date a:ce i:.-om Harry Oshir.··aJ ":Sxperien~e cf Labour .Absorption
in Postwar Taiwan," a paper present2d to the Ccnference or Manpower Problems in
East and Southeast Asia :i.n Singapore, M8y zz,,28, 197 L
2

1 wouJ.d like to acknocs'ledge the a:::sistance of Pr:Jfesscr N, R. Chen
of Cornell University in th:.i.s co.1text:,

-36The use of labor is most intensive in electronics assembly industry.
vJhile parts are mainly assembled with the aid of machines in the United
States, this work is performed by women workers in Taiwano

According to the

general manager of one major electronics firm, the amount of labor used in
assembling one set of television in the Taiwan factory is

50 percent greater

than that in a factory of the parent company in the United States.

In fact,

most of the electronics firms interviewed were making efforts in one way or
another to introduce labor-inten sive methods.

The capital-lab or ratio of

these firms has been generally rising through time.

The largest electronics

factory in Taiwan has experienced an increase of capital by nine times and an
increase of employment by sixteen times between 1965 and 1969.

Throughout

the electronics industry, capital-lab or ratios have apparently fallen during
the 60's.

Many of the managers interviewed pointed out that the wage bill

was lower in spite of the substantial ly larger relative volume of employment.
One tentative conclusion which may be derived from these plant visits
is that the closer the production process is to the raw material processing
stage, i..e.. backward linkages, the smaller the chances for efficient labor/
capital substitutio n statically or capital-stre tching innovations dynamically ;
the closer the process to the finished product stage, the greater are these
possibiliti es.
This episodal approach is consistent with, though it admittedly does
not conclusivel y prove, our main point, i.e. that the typical developing
country, especially one which is open and not too large in size, can expect-
with appropriate policy changes taking place--to transit from import substi
tution, with pure technologic al transplanta tion the order of the day, to ex
port substitutio n with labor-using innovations taking on major significanc e.
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Once shortages in domestic entrepren eurial capacity and other economic over
heads have been repaired, if and when the hothouse temperatu re is gradually
~educed, labor-usin g types of technolog ical change, both of the unintenti onal
and of the intention al variety, assume increasin g importanc e.

In this phase

the famous conflict between output and employment objective s in industria l
developme nt may be subject to fundament al challenge •. Both the historica l ex•
perience of Japan and that of Korea and Taiwan in recent years illustrat e that
the current wide-spre ad skepticism concernin g the supposed tyranny of the
rigid technical coefficie nts may be seriously in erroro

This error derives

in the main from an underesti mate of the potential inventive ness of indi•
genous entrepren eurs, once they are given access, at a price, to the required
inputs.

And this is no trivial mattero

For if our skepticism here is un

warranted , this would be among the most powerful arguments for accelerat ing
the current, rather slow and uneven) trend towards liberaliz ation and the
erosion of the substanti al shadow price/mar ket price different ials in factor
and commodity marketsG

